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Abstract The paper describes the development of an integrated multi-agent online
dispute resolution environment called IMODRE that was designed to assist parties
involved in Australian family law disputes achieve legally fairer negotiated outcomes.
The system extends our previous work in developing negotiation support systems Fam-
ily_Winner and AssetDivider. In this environment one agent uses a Bayesian Belief
Network expertly modeled with knowledge of the Australian Family Law domain to
advise disputants of their Best Alternatives to Negotiated Agreements. Another agent
incorporates the percentage split of marital property into an integrative bargaining
process and applies heuristics and game theory to equitably distribute marital prop-
erty assets and facilitate further trade-offs. We use this system to add greater fairness
to Family property law negotiations.
Keywords BATNAs · Bayesian belief networks · Integrative negotiation ·
Multi-agent systems · Negotiation supports systems · Online dispute resolution
1 Introduction
One of the major concerns raised by people using Negotiation Support Systems (NSS)
is about the fairness of the process. Individuals undertake negotiation to derive better
outcomes than could be obtained from conflict and litigation. Thus, they often engage
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in interest based negotiation. But interest based negotiation focuses upon the interests
of disputants rather than upon objective measures of fairness or justice. For example
in Australian family law, differences in power between men and women may lead
to negotiated results that favour men. Bargaining imbalances can thus produce unfair
results unless mediators or NSS overcome them. It is thus vital to incorporate measures
to address fairness in the development of NSS.
The research aims to assist disputants achieve legally fairer negotiated outcomes
through development of an integrated online dispute resolution (ODR) environment
(IMODRE) that incorporates their best alternatives to negotiated agreements (BAT-
NAs) into an integrative bargaining process. The notion of a BATNA was introduced
by Fisher and Ury (1981) as an integral factor in their development of principled
negotiation. Principled negotiation promotes deciding issues on their merits rather
than through a haggling process focused on what each side says it will and will not
do.
The reason you negotiate with someone is to produce better results than would
otherwise occur. If you are unaware of what results you could obtain if the negotia-
tions are unsuccessful (your BATNA), you run the risk of entering into an agreement
that you would be better off rejecting; or rejecting an agreement you would be better
off entering into. Including a BATNA in the bargaining process provides a starting
point for negotiations and allows disputants to trade-off assets within the parameters
of likely litigated outcomes.
IMODRE provides negotiation advice in the domain of Australian Family Law dis-
putes, and was developed on a multi-agent platform with individual agents deployed
to carry out specific negotiation tasks. One agent uses a Bayesian belief network and
an adaptation of Toulmin argument structures1 (Toulmin 1958) to recommend a per-
centage property split2. This advice represents a disputants’ BATNA. Another agent
combines this percentage split with heuristics and game theory to facilitate integrative
bargaining between parties.
The research is supported by industry partners Relationships Australia (Queens-
land branch)3 and Victoria Body Corporate Services4, both of whom believe there
are significant benefits to be gained for their clients by investing in innovative new
approaches to dispute management.
The paper commences with a discussion of various negotiation strategies includ-
ing the concepts of bargaining in the show of the law, the notion of a BATNA, and
integrative and distributive type negotiations. We also explain which strategies have
1 The adaptation of Toulmin (1958) we use views all arguments, regardless of the domain, as having a
structure which consists of four basic invariants: claim, data, warrant and backing. Every argument makes
an assertion. The assertion of an argument stands as the claim of the argument. A mechanism is required to
act as a justification for the claim, given the data. This justification is known as the warrant. The backing
supports the warrant and in a legal argument is typically a reference to a statute or precedent case.
2 One of the steps judges of the Family Court of Australia follow in order to determine the distribution of
marital property is to arrive at a determination of the percentage of property to be awarded to each partner
(Zeleznikow 2004).
3 http://www.relationships.com.au/who-we-are/state-and-territory-organisations/qld. Last accessed 2
January 2010.
4 http://www.vbcs.com.au/. Last accessed 2 January 2010.
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been applied our system. The paper then provides an overview of NSS and describes
examples of their current use and potential advantages. The next section discusses
how intelligent agents are increasingly being used to provide negotiation support. Our
previous work in developing the NSS AssetDivider is then demonstrated to provide a
background perspective of our research.
Section 5 presents our multi-agent NSS architecture with a step by step example
used to demonstrate the typical system processing and individual agent functional-
ity. The paper concludes with a discussion of our industry partners’ involvement in
the project and describes how we are evaluating the current system. We also pres-
ent the research design for a more comprehensive evaluation of our integrated ODR
environment.
2 Negotiation Strategies
This section provides an overview of various negotiation strategies and explains the
rationale for choosing the strategies that are deployed in the IMODRE system.
2.1 Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law and the Notion of a BATNA
Traditional negotiation support systems (NSS) have focused upon providing users
with decision support on how they might best achieve their goals (Raiffa 1982).
A fundamental issue arises whenever anyone builds a NSS for use in legal domains:
is the system being developed concerned with supporting mediation or providing jus-
tice? When issues of justice are not reflected in the outcome of the mediation process,
bargaining theory has its limitations. Because most legal dispute resolution occurs
outside the court-room, there are fewer opportunities to ensure fair decision-making.
In support of this argument, Galanter (2004) claims:
In the federal courts, the percentage of civil cases reaching trial has fallen from
11% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002. In spite of a five-fold increase in case terminations,
the absolute number of civil trials was 20% lower in 2002 than it was 40 years
earlier.
In writing about the Vanishing American Trial, Galanter argues that whilst litiga-
tion in the United States is increasing, the number of trials decided by US judges has
declined drastically. This is because litigants are using alternative forms of Dispute
Resolution.
Negotiations in law are often conducted in the shadow of the Law, i.e. bargaining
in legal domains mimics the probable outcome of litigation. Mnookin and Kornhauser
(1979) introduced the bargaining in the shadow of the trial concept. By examining
the case of divorce law, they contended that the legal rights of each party could be
understood as bargaining chips that can affect settlement outcomes.
A similar view of negotiation is expressed by Bibas (2004) who states that:
the conventional wisdom is that litigants bargain towards settlement in the
shadow of expected trial outcomes. In this model, rational parties forecast the
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expected trial outcome and strike bargains that leave both sides better off by
splitting the saved costs of trial. This shadow of trial model now dominates the
literature on civil settlements.
A crucial component to bargaining in the shadow of the law is the Notion of a
BATNA. Fisher and Ury (1981) introduced the notion of a BATNA concept as a
tool for negotiators to cope with power imbalances. As stated above, they claim that,
if negotiators do take account of their options outside a negotiation, they are better
protected against agreements that should be rejected. It also helps them to reach agree-
ments that better satisfy their interests. In order to assess whether an offer should be
rejected, a party in a dispute has to establish what can be accomplished in alternative
procedures to the one currently being conducted. Once the alternatives are known,
these can be compared to what one expects to win by accepting an offer in the current
procedure.
For example, when a person wishes to buy a used car, they will usually refer to
a commonly accepted set of approximate automotive prices. Using this initial figure
and considering other variables such as new components, the distance traveled by the
car and its current condition, the buyer then decides the value they wish to place on
a car. If the seller is not willing to sell the car at this price, then they can argue the
merits of their valuation in an attempt to persuade the seller to accept their BATNA.
Alexander (1997) argues that because women tend to be more reluctant than men to
continue conflict, if their major goal is to be the primary care giver for their children,
they may reach a negotiated settlement, which whilst acceptable to them is patently
unjust. Bargaining imbalances can thus produce unfair results unless mediators or
NSS overcome them. Take for example a marriage in Australia where the couple have
been married for 15 years and have three children, one of whom has special needs.
Suppose the husband works full-time, whilst the wife is not employed outside the
house and is a full-time carer for the husband and children. Suppose they own a house
valued at $400,000 with a mortgage of $250,000. Further, the husband earns $45,000
per annum. Given that this is both a low income and low asset marriage (the common
pool is let us say $180,000) the wife might be expected to receive 70% of the common
pool in a family court settlement. This 70% split represents the wife’s BATNA.
As an important starting point in a negotiation, BATNAs can be used to form a
basis from which fair agreements can be obtained, thus, incorporating a BANTA into
the negotiation process offers a degree of safety against power imbalances that may
occur with these types of negotiations.
2.2 Integrative and Distributive Negotiation
Ponte and Cavenagh (2004) define negotiation as a process of refining and agreeing to
the issues requiring resolution, establishing a range of compromise options from which
to choose and selecting the appropriate option for settlement. Essentially negotiation
requires a balancing of one’s own needs with a view toward arriving at an agreement
that satisfies both sets of requirements.
Walton and Mckersie (1965) propose that negotiation processes can be classified as
distributive or integrative. In distributive approaches, the problems are seen as “zero
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sum” and resources are imagined as fixed: divide the pie. In integrative approaches,
problems are seen as having more potential solutions than are immediately obvious
and the goal is to expand the pie before dividing it. Parties attempt to accommodate
as many interests of each of the parties as possible, leading to the so called win–win
or all gain approach. As Kersten (2001) notes, although Walton and McKersie did
not suggest one type of negotiation being superior to the other, over the years, it has
become conventional wisdom that the integrative type allows for better compromises,
win–win solutions, value creation and expanding the pie. Fisher and Ury (1981) and
Lax and Sebenius (1986) discuss these issues in detail.
Most negotiation outside the legal domain focuses upon interest-based negotiation.
Expanding on the notion of integrative or interest-based negotiation, principled nego-
tiation promotes deciding issues on their merits rather than through a haggling process
focused on what each side says it will and will not do (Fisher and Ury 1981). Amongst
the features of principled negotiation are: separating the people from the problem;
focusing upon interests rather than positions; insisting upon objective criteria and
knowing your BATNA.
In Family_Winner (Bellucci and Zeleznikow 2006), we applied an integrative bar-
gaining model to develop our NSS. Initially disputants were required to indicate
explicitly how much they value each of the different issues in dispute by distrib-
uting 100 points across the range of issues. If as is generally the case, the disputants
do not have directly opposing goals, it is likely that each disputant will receive more
than 50 points. This is an improvement on any strategy that is based on the zero-sum
philosophy, where each party wins what the other loses, and thus, leads to the
so-called win–win or all gain approach.
In more recent versions of our software linguistic variables are used. It is more
natural for disputants to express how they value items in a dispute in terms of lan-
guage, rather than numbers. The language can of course be translated into numbers,
as explained by Zeleznikow and Bellucci (2006).
3 Negotiation Support Systems
This section provides on overview of NSSs, including the various types that are avail-
able, specific applications in use today, and potential advantages of using such systems.
3.1 Background to Negotiation Support Systems
Many NSSs such as Adjusted Winner (Brams and Taylor 1996), Smartsettle (Thiessen
and McMahon 2000) and Family_Winner use bargaining and game theory to provide
win–win solutions to participants in disputes. Adjusted Winner and SmartSettle—can
be used to provide negotiation advice whereas Split-Up (Stranieri et al. 1999) and
AssetDivider (Bellucci 2008) focus upon decision support for negotiation.
Adjusted Winner is a two party point allocation procedure that distributes items or
issues to people on the premise of whoever values the item or issue more. The two
disputants are required to explicitly indicate how much they value each of the different
issues by distributing 100 points across the range of issues in dispute. In this paradigm,
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it is assumed there are k discrete issues in dispute, each of which is assumed divisible.
The Adjusted Winner paradigm is a fair and equitable procedure because at the end
of allocation, each party will have accrued the same number of points.
SmartSettle is an interactive computer program developed to assist those involved
in negotiating agreements among parties having conflicting objectives. The system
can be used during the negotiation process by opposing parties or by a professional
mediator. On the basis of information provided to the program, in confidence, by each
party, the NSS can help all parties identify feasible alternatives, if any exist, that should
be preferred to each party’s proposal. If such alternatives do not exist, the program
can help parties develop counter proposals.
SPLIT-UP is a hybrid rule based/ neural network system that uses textbooks, heuris-
tics, expert advice and cases to model that part of the Family Law Act 1975 (Australia)
which deals with property division. Explanation is provided through the use of Toul-
min argument structures. Though Split-Up is a decision support system rather than
a negotiation support system, the tool does provide disputants with their respective
BATNAs and hence provides an important starting point for negotiations (Lodder and
Zeleznikow 2010).
Family_Winner asked the disputants to list the items in dispute and to attach impor-
tance values to indicate how significant it is that the disputants be awarded each of the
items. The system uses this information to form trade-off rules. The trade-off rules are
then used to allocate issues according to a “logrolling” strategy5.
AssetDivider, which is described in detail in Sect. 4, is a system developed to meet
the needs of family dispute resolution practitioners (FDRPs) at Relationships Australia
(Queensland). The program generalises Family_Winner by including financial values
of property and allowing FDRPs to move the negotiation (so as to meet the paramount
interests of the children) in favour of one party to the negotiation.
In considering the principles and theory underlying their integrated online dispute
resolution (ODR) environment, Lodder and Zeleznikow (2005) first evaluated the
order in which online disputes are best resolved. The system proposed conforms to
the following sequencing, which produces the most effective ODR environment:
(1) First, the negotiation support tool should provide feedback on the likely out-
come(s) of the dispute if the negotiation were to fail—i.e., the BATNA.
(2) Second, the tool should attempt to resolve any existing conflicts using argumen-
tation or dialogue techniques.
(3) Third, for those issues not resolved in step two, the tool should employ decision
analysis techniques and compensation/trade-off strategies in order to facilitate
resolution of the dispute.
Finally, if the result from step three is not acceptable to the parties, the tool should
allow the parties to return to step two and repeat the process recursively until either
the dispute is resolved or a stalemate occurs. A stalemate occurs when no progress is
made when moving from step 2 to step 3 or vice versa. Even if a stalemate occurs,
5 Logrolling is a process in which participants look collectively at multiple issues to find issues that one
party considers more important than does the opposing party. Logrolling is successful if the parties concede
issues to which they give low importance values. See Pruitt (1981).
123
Development of an Integrated Multi-agent Online Dispute Resolution Environment 9
suitable forms of ADR (such as blind bidding or arbitration) can be used on a smaller
set of issues.
In the domain of Australian Family Law, Split-Up provides advice about BATNAs,
whilst Family_Winner and AssetDivider employ decision analysis techniques and
compensation/trade-off strategies to facilitate resolution of the dispute. Conceivably,
an Online Family Dispute Resolution Service could consider the provision of advice
not only about outcomes and BATNAs, but also about processes and how disputants
should act ‘fairly’ and ‘reasonably’ during the mediation.
3.2 The Benefits of Online Negotiation Support
Katsh and Rifkin (2001) state that compared to litigation, alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) has the advantages of (a) Lower cost; (b) Greater speed; (c) More flexibility
in outcomes; (d) Less adversarial; (f) More informal; (g) Solution rather than blame-
oriented; and (h) Private.
Online dispute resolution is a branch of dispute resolution which uses technology
to facilitate the resolution of disputes between parties. Primarily, ODR involves nego-
tiation, mediation or arbitration, or a combination of all three. In this respect, ODR
is conceivably, analogous to ADR. However, ODR can also augment these traditional
means of resolving disputes by applying innovative techniques and online technologies
to the process.
Zeleznikow and Bellucci (2003) suggest that in terms of family mediation, ODR
has the following additional benefits over ADR:
• Disputants do not have to meet face-to-face: an important factor if there has been
a history of violence; and
• Family dispute resolution (FDR) can occur at any time, with participants located
in different countries.
The use of Information Technology can further promote many of the benefits of ADR.
• By receiving advice online, and in particular receiving such advice from decision
support systems (DSS), costs incurred in the dispute will be reduced because the
disputants will have a lower reliance on support from lawyers and mediators.
• Because the advice will be available online, or at least through the use of com-
puter systems, such advice will be timely and mostly in real time to inform the
agreement.
• The backlog in disputants seeing lawyers or FDRPs will be less critical than cur-
rently - anecdotal evidence shows that time taken to hear a dispute is often a factor
in successful resolution of a dispute. The sooner disputants are able to have their
views heard; the more likely is the prospect of a successful resolution.
• One major advantage of using NSSs for advice is the ability for disputants and
FDRPs to conduct hypothetical sessions with the systems.
• Rather than mandate solutions, NSSs such as Family Winner (Bellucci and
Zeleznikow 2006) can offer disputants advice—which they are free to reject. Fur-
ther, if users of the system are unhappy with the advice given by the system,
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they can alter their inputs. This approach forces the disputants to re-examine their
priorities.
• Because of their ability to efficiently search through a wide variety of solutions and
meet disputants’ needs, NSSs can provide more flexibility in providing a useful
range of outcomes.
Conley Tyler and McPherson (2006) propose that ODR potentially offers advantages
over face-to-face primary family dispute resolution in the following circumstances:
• ODR makes it possible to provide family law dispute resolution services to parties
who are geographically remote. In the past, the process of separation and divorce
involved written correspondence and expensive litigation, increasing the cost in
terms of time and travel and accommodation. Given that the settlement of a divorce
comes out of the one pool of assets, any methodology in the separation process
that reduces costs clearly benefits the agreement negotiations
• ODR offers the opportunity for managing the contact and communication in a
less threatening situation where domestic violence, perceived power imbalance or
abuse is a factor in the relationship
• Use of the on-line methods also allows for the prompt and virtually immediate
delivery of progress and agreements made during the FDR and of settlement pro-
posals
• ODR can be used in combination with face-to-face dispute resolution when it is
used to clarify stories and issues before a meeting and to facilitate post-FDR session
actions, negotiations and drafting the terms of settlement (Boulle 2005).
To assist the on-line media to manage negotiations and resolve disputes among couples,
as mentioned above, a range of negotiation support systems are available to augment
the decision making processes. DSS are used in a range of situations including medi-
cine, military and aeronautical contexts. In the FDR context, similar technologies have
been specifically developed to meet requirements. NSS offer further enhancements to
conceivably increase effectiveness, fairness and satisfaction with the FDR process.
3.3 Agents and Negotiation
There has been much research on intelligent agents and automated negotiation. See
for example Kraus (2001). She claims:
Negotiation has been a subject of central interest in multi-agent systems, as it
has been in economics and political science. The word has been used in a vari-
ety of ways, though in general it refers to communication processes that further
coordination and cooperation. Negotiations can be used to resolve conflicts in a
wide variety of multi-agent domains (Jennings et al. 2000). Examples of such
applications include conflicts over the usage of joint resources or task assign-
ments, conflicts concerning document allocation in multi-server environments
and conflicts between a buyer and a seller in electronic commerce.
Kraus et al. (2008) state:
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Our goal is the development of automated agents that can negotiate efficiently
with people in crises. Such agents may be used, for example, in electronic com-
merce and for training negotiators. We focus on bilateral negotiations in simu-
lated crises characterized by time constraints, deadlines, full information, and
the possibility of opting out.
The automated agent can play the role of either side in such negotiations. The
model used on which the automated agent is based is a formal analysis of a
scenario using game-theoretic methods and heuristics for bargaining. The for-
mal analysis applies a definition of a crisis that models various aspects of such
situations. In particular, a crisis is a conflict between two agents that threatens
core values, where time is short, and that requires urgent negotiation to reach an
agreement. The crisis can end with the negotiators signing an agreement or with
one of the sides opting out of the negotiations.
Today, artificial intelligence (AI) can be seen as the study and design of intelligent
agents, where an intelligent agent is a system that perceives its environment and takes
actions which maximize its chances of success (Russell and Norvig 2003). Among the
traits that we believe make an agent based approach a suitable platform for developing
our NSS are reasoning, knowledge, planning, learning, communication, perception
and the ability to move and manipulate objects.
Our NSS can be implemented in its present form with conventional Web based
programming techniques and simple remote procedure calls using, for instance, the
SOAP protocol6. A multi-agent platform is more suitable for our needs, however,
because it allows us to implement a distributed architecture with independent services
offering a degree of autonomy, including AI techniques such as Bayesian reasoning,
game theory, and linguistic analysis of text. Intelligent agents are a favoured method
of implementing these techniques within the AI community.
The multi-agent platform allows part of the negotiation process to be automated. For
instance, we are developing a mediator agent capable of guiding disputants through the
mediation process with features such as linguistic analysis to identify dispute agenda
items, automatic text summary to clarify parties opening positions, and assistance for
mediators with readily available questions and responses at appropriate stages of the
mediation.
4 Family_Winner and AssetDivider
This section presents our previous work in developing the NSS Family_Winner and
AssetDivider.
4.1 Research Background
The research builds on our previous work in developing the NSS Family_Winner
and AssetDivider. Family_Winner (Bellucci and Zeleznikow 2006) is a system that
6 http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/NOTE-SOAP-20000508/. Last accessed 11 January 2010.
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allocates items to one of two parties in the dispute. Family_Winner’s method of deci-
sion support involves a complex number of techniques, including the incorporation
of an Issue Decomposition Hierarchy, a Compensation and Trade-off strategy, and an
Allocation strategy. The trade-offs pertaining to a disputant are graphically displayed
through a series of trade-off maps.
Family_Winner provided decision support for mediators. Whilst it had an underly-
ing principle of meeting the disputants’ needs to similar degrees, it realized that most
disputants have fuzzy views of their desires, and these desires regularly change. Hence
an exact equality of points was not required. Family_Winner was initially developed
with expert legal advice from Victoria Legal Aid, and more recently with the Queens-
land Branch of Relationships Australia. When we evaluated Family_
Winner (Zeleznikow and Bellucci 2003), Victorian Legal aid noted that the system
focused upon meeting the interests of the parents (as would Adjusted Winner, Smart-
settle and indeed most NSSs). But in Australian Family law, the notion of fairness or
justice is concerned with meeting the paramount interests of the children and not the
interests of the parents.
An updated version of Family_Winner called AssetDivider was later developed at
the request of the Queensland Branch of Relationships Australia (RAQ), who wished
to use our software to support family dispute resolution practitioners and disputants to
arrive at legally fair solutions. As discussed in Sect. 6, RAQ had become aware of the
existence of Family_Winner through the ABC Science Show the New Inventors. The
Family_Winner system works on the principle that both parties in a dispute should
have their needs equally met (as is traditionally the case in integrative bargaining).
Because RAQ focuses upon the paramount interests of the children and not the inter-
ests of the parents7, they wanted us to construct a system where RAQ FDRPs could
propose a percentage split to reflect the percentage of the common pool of assets each
party should receive in the final settlement. The AssetDivider software would then
provide negotiation decision support based on this advice. Thus a significant addi-
tional feature of AssetDivider over Family_Winner is the consideration of monetary
values and the required percentage split for the pool items in dispute.
4.2 AssetDivider User input
Asset_Divider takes a list of issues (usually items for distribution between two par-
ties) and allocates them based on a rating given by the parties in dispute. Two sets of
ratings are provided, one for each party in dispute. This rating (initially a numerical
value between 0 and 100, but now a linguistic variable) does not represent the mon-
etary value of the item, instead it symbolises how important the item is to the party.
Initially this information was obtained by asking disputants to provide numbers for
their desires. But whilst such a task might be difficult, especially when involved in a
7 Unlike the case in most US jurisdictions (where Family Law is a state matter), under Australian law,
parents have no rights, only obligations. For example, in a dispute over the welfare of the children, biological
parents have no extra rights or influence compared to other careers.
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dispute, as explained in Sect. 5, asking disputants to order their preferences is indeed
natural. We assume a party wants to keep an item they feel is important to them.
AssetDivider also accepts the current monetary value of each item in dispute. We
assume this dollar value has been negotiated (if necessary) before AssetDivider is
used. Hence, only one dollar value is entered per item. The proposed percentage split
is also entered. This figure has to be derived from the mediator’s knowledge in past
cases or from computer systems such as SplitUp (Stranieri et al. 1999), which can
provide a percentage split given certain characteristics and features of divorce cases.
4.3 Allocation Strategy
The order by which issues are allocated is of paramount importance in a negotia-
tion. Professional mediators have indicated issues attracting little disputation should
be presented foremost for allocation, so as to help foster a positive environment in
which to negotiate. By summing the ratings of issues to 100, the level of discourse
surrounding an issue can be measured by calculating the numerical distance between
the ratings of an issue assigned by each of the parties (Zeleznikow et al. 2007). For
example, if two parties assign the same high rating to an item, then it is expected the
level of disputation surrounding the issue to be substantial (because both parties want
the item), whereas large differences between the ratings of parties indicate the issue
will be resolved much more quickly. Both Family_Winner and AssetDivider use this
strategy in deciding the order by which items are presented for allocation.
AssetDivider’s allocation strategy works by provisionally allocating an item to the
party whose rating is the highest. It then checks the dollar value of items it has been
allocated previously (that is, their current list of items), the dollar value of the item
presently allocated and the dollar amount permitted under the percentage split given
by mediators. If by allocating the item in question the party exceeds its permitted
amount, the item is removed from its allocation list and placed back into negotiation.
In this case, the item has not been allocated to a party. If the dollar value of the item
was within the limits of the amount permitted under the percentage split rule, then the
allocation proceeds. Once an allocation has occurred the ‘losing party’ is compensated
by the trade-off equations modifying ratings (whereas in Family_Winner both winning
and losing parties were affected).
4.4 Asset Negotiation Example
This sub-section will review the process and advice about a Family Law case trialed
on AssetDivider. The aim of this exercise is to demonstrate the system’s operation in
practice. Table 1 below describes a divorce case provided by RAQ: we move directly
to the numerical values translated from the linguistic variables.
Suggested percentage split: “40/60 (where 40% to Husband and 60% to Wife.
This means Husband is entitled to 108,000 and wife 162,000”. Intake details of the
negotiation are shown in Fig. 1.
The next screen that appears lists the issues in dispute (Fig. 2), their ratings and
the allocation summary, which is filled in appropriately when the user clicks button
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Table 1 List of assets
Item name (including assets and debts) $ Value Husband’s ratings Wife’s ratings
House mortgage 350,000 (200,000) 30 60
W car 10,000 0 10
Boat 30,000 20 0
Shares 50,000 30 10
Cash (savings) 20,000 30 20
H Car 10,000 10 0
Totals 270,000
Fig. 1 Intake screen
“Calculate allocations”. In the Allocation Summary table, we can see that the rat-
ings for Husband (party A) and Wife (party B) are scaled to add to 100 in columns
ComputedValuePartyA and ComputedValuePartyB, respectively. It is then these rat-
ings that are used to drive the allocation.
The allocation, taking into account each party’s’ priorities (ratings) and percentage
split is summarized below (Table 2):
In analysing the case, we can see that husband (Party A) wanted the shares (27.50),
then the house (25) and savings (23.49). He valued the boat at 16.67, his car (Hus-
band’s car) 8.68 and W(wife’s) car 0. Given he is entitled to only 40% of the total,
we consider he would be happy with his allocation of the boat, shares, cash saving
and his car (H car). The wife valued the house quite considerably at 55.56. Obtaining
the house was her priority above all else. The rest were valued quite minimally, with
shares at 18.52, boat 11.11, her car (W car) and H car at 3.70 each and cash savings
at 7.41. We believe she would also be happy with her allocation, as she was given the
house (of utter importance) and her car (W car).
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Fig. 2 Allocation summary screen
Table 2 Allocation list for husband (party A) and wife (party B)
Husband’s list
of allocated items
Husband’s $ value
of each item
Wife’s list of allocated
items
Wife’s $ value of each
item
Boat 30,000 House 350,000
Shares 50,000 W Car 10,000
Cash 20,000 Mortgage 200,000
H car 10,000
Totals for Husband: $110,000; and wife: $160,000; that is very close to the 40/60 split requested
The reason why Husband and Wife were both allocated the cars was because each
valued each other’s at 0. As long as their allocation did not violate the percentage split
allowance, there was no real negotiation about who wanted the cars.
5 Multi-agent Negotiation Support Architecture
IMODRE, which stands for integrated online dispute resolution environment, was
developed to provide more comprehensive negotiation support than that given by
Family_Winner and AddetDivider. IMODRE was developed using the JADE8 agent
development platform, and is configured to run on a Tomcat server using MySQL9 and
JDBC10 for database connectivity. One agent uses a Bayesian Belief Network expertly
8 http://jade.tilab.com/. Last accessed 2 January 2010.
9 http://www.mysql.com/. Last accessed 11 January 2010.
10 http://java.sun.com/javase/technologies/database/. Last accessed 11 January 2010.
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Main Container 
Interface Agent 
Asset Divider Agent BATNA Agent 
DS 
GUI 
AMS 
Fig. 3 Multi-agent negotiation support architecture
modeled with knowledge of the Australian Family Law domain to advise disputants by
means of a percentage property split, of their Best Alternatives to Negotiated Agree-
ments. Another agent incorporates this percentage split into an integrative bargaining
process and applies heuristics and game theory to equitably distribute marital property
assets and facilitate further trade-offs.
The JADE main container also provides two special agents; (1) an agent manage-
ment system (AMS) that ensures that each agent has a unique name, and allows agents
on external containers to be terminated; and (2) a directory facilitator (DF) that lists
services offered by agents so that other agents can find them. Agents communicate
using the FIPA ACL11 language specification. The system architecture is presented in
Fig. 3.
The IMODRE architecture represents the classic master/slave architecture which
in some ways may be considered contrary to the decentralized nature of multi-agent
systems. It is, however, a suitable architecture for our needs because all decisions
are interrelated and the negotiation process requires central coordination. The type of
agent interaction is facilitative with the agents performing specific negotiation tasks
and coordinating to assist disputants in reaching a negotiated settlement. The archi-
tecture is vastly different from the fully automated negotiation systems described by
Fatima et al. (2009) and Oshrat et al. (2009) where agents negotiate directly with each
other.
Because the system is Web based, parties are able to conduct negotiations from
separate geographical locations, provided they have internet access. This is a major
advantage in cases where face-to face meetings are not feasible, or where parties are
located at great distances apart.
11 http://www.fipa.org. Last accessed 2 January 2010.
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Fig. 4 Interface agent workflow
5.1 Interface Agent
The interface agent acts as the system’s gateway to external resources. The agent
interacts with users via a JSP12 graphical user interface, and manages the negotiation
process by coordinating multi-agent activities. It has a wider perspective of the system
than the other agents in the group, creates plans and assigns tasks to individual agents
in order to ensure global coherence.
The interface agent collects input parameters from the disputants. It then selects
the initial goal to obtain an agreed percentage split via the BATNA agent and creates
a plan to meet this goal. If the goal is not met the process starts again and a new plan
is formulated based on the new input parameters it receives from the disputants. If the
goal is met then the next goal is chosen, which is to allocate assets to the disputants as
equitably as possible and obtain their agreement on the allocation via the AssetDivider
agent. If this goal is met then the negotiation process is complete and agreement is
considered to have been reached. If the goal is not met parties can re-negotiate and
trade-off assets until they are satisfied with the allocation (Fig. 4)
5.2 BATNA Agent
The BATNA agent user a Bayesian belief network to infer a percentage property
split. Bayesian belief networks13 are powerful tools for modelling causes and effects
12 Java Server Pages (JSP) technology provides a simplified, fast way to create dynamic web content.
http://java.sun.com/products/jsp/. Last accessed 12 January 2010.
13 http://www.cra.com/pdf/BNetBuilderBackground.pdf. Last accessed 2 January 2010.
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in a wide variety of domains. They are compact networks of probabilities that cap-
ture the probabilistic relationship between variables, as well as historical information
about their relationships. They are very effective for modelling situations where some
information is already known and incoming data is uncertain or partially unavailable
(unlike rule-based or “expert” systems, where uncertain or unavailable data results in
ineffective or inaccurate reasoning).
Equation 1 is known as the Bayesian rule. The concept considers that event A is
dependent upon event B.
p(A|B) = p(B|A) × p(A)
p(B)
(1)
Bayes’ theorem can be transformed to the following equation to account for both
multiple hypothesis and multiple evidence:
p(Hi |E1 E2 . . . En) = p(E1 E2 . . . En|Hi ) × p(Hi )m∑
k=1
p(E1 E2 . . . En|Hk) × p(Hk)
(2)
Toulmin argument structures can complement Bayesian belief networks by providing
a mechanism for decomposing tasks into sub-tasks, and extracting claims and data
items from a series of interconnected arguments.
Muecke et al. (2008), with the assistance of Australian Family Law Expert Andrew
Combes, have modelled judicial reasoning, using an adaptation of Toulmin argument
structures and a Bayesian Belief Network for the purpose of determining a percentage
split of assets between divorcing couples. In their argument tree, a series of sub-level
arguments culminate into three top level arguments that represent the three factors con-
sidered most important by the domain expert in determining the division of marital
property assets. At the top of the tree is the root node, which represents the percentage
property split.
With permission from Muecke et al. (2008), we were able use the structure of this
argument tree to develop an agent for our NSS that provides parties with their BATNA
during marital property negotiations.
The BATNA agent uses an inference method called the Recursive Conditioning
algorithm. This method exploits assumptions to decompose a Bayesian network into
smaller, disconnected pieces that can be solved independently. The algorithm is for-
malised below:14
• Let C be a set of variables such that the instantiated network <N,c> is decomposed
into two disconnected subnetworks < N , c >l and < N, c >r .
• Then
P N (e) =
∑
c
P〈N ,c〉(e) =
∑
c
P〈N ,c〉l(el)P〈N ,c〉r (er ) (3)
14 http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/mkhkoivi/teaching/sum-products-fall05/presentations/parviainen.pdf. Last
accessed 2 January 2010.
123
Development of an Integrated Multi-agent Online Dispute Resolution Environment 19
Table 3 Circumstances of
marriage (evidences) E1 The wealth of the couple can be considered average
E2 The wife in future will need more
E3 The wife in the past has contributed more
Table 4 Three possible
outcomes (Hypothesis’) H1 60% of property awarded to wife
H2 60% of property awarded to husband
H3 50%
Table 5 Prior and conditional
probabilities Hypothesis
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
p(Hi ) 0.45 0.35 0.20
p(E1|Hi ) 0.25 0.60 0.55
p(E2|Hi ) 0.80 0.40 0.65
p(E3|Hi ) 0.70 0.00 0.80
where el and er are subsets of instantiation e pertaining to subnetworks < N , c >l
and < N , c >r .
• Queries P<N ,c>l(el) and P<N ,c>r (er ) can be decomposed using the same method
recursively.
Users are required to assert their beliefs about marriage contributions, the com-
mon pool of assets, and future needs at one level down from the root node in the
argument tree. If the parties agree on all three sub-arguments, or alternatively, if the
same percentage property split is inferred through different combinations of sub-
arguments assertions, agreement is said to be reached and both parties are advised of
the recommended percentage split.
Suppose a couple named Bob and Carol are divorcing and have both agreed that
the wealth of the couple can be considered average, Carol has greater future needs,
and Carol has contributed more. We therefore have the evidence shown in Table 3:
We also compare three possible outcomes represented as a set of Hypothesis:
For the given three conditionally independent evidences (Table 3) and three mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses (Table 4), our family law domain expert
has established the following prior probabilities for these hypothesis and conditional
probabilities of observing each evidence with each hypothesis (Table 5)
Thus, by applying Eq. 2:
p(H1|E1 E2 . . . En)
= 0.25 × 0.8 × 0.7 × 0.45
0.25 × 0.8 × 0.7 × 0.45 + 0.6 × 0.4 × 0.0 × 0.35 + 0.55 × 0.65 × 0.8 × 0.2
= 0.52
123
20 B. Abrahams et al.
Fig. 5 Top-level assertions
p(H2|E1 E2 . . . En)
= 0.6 × 0.4 × 0.0 × 0.35
0.25 × 0.8 × 0.7 × 0.45 + 0.6 × 0.4 × 0.0 × 0.35 + 0.55 × 0.65 × 0.8 × 0.2
= 0
p(H3|E1 E2 . . . En)
= 0.55 × 0.65 × 0.8 × 0.2
0.25 × 0.8 × 0.7 × 0.45 + 0.6 × 0.4 × 0.0 × 0.35 + 0.55 × 0.65 × 0.8 × 0.2
= 0.48
Hypothesis 1 (H1) is calculated to be the most likely outcome. The BATNA agent has
therefore inferred that a family court judge is most likely to award 60% of the marital
property to Carol should the matter be litigated (Fig. 5).
The recommended percentage split is then passed to the Asset Divider agent.
If agreement is not initially reached, users are asked if they wish to change the
assertions in the nodes where disagreement exists. If this step fails to resolve the mat-
ter, parties are then prompted to make assertions at the next lower sub-argument level.
This process continues until either the arguments for a branch are agreed upon or a
leaf argument of the dispute is reached.
If the leaf argument of the dispute is reached without agreement, then both parties
assertions for that particular node are accepted. This is demonstrated in Fig. 6 where
parties are unable to agree at the leaf node ‘Past Level of Employment’. The asser-
tion ‘Unemployed’ and ‘Irregularly employed’ are therefore equally accepted and the
percentage split is inferred on this basis.
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Fig. 6 Leaf node assertions
5.3 AssetDivider Agent
The AssetDivider agent uses a modified version of the Adjusted Winner algorithm
developed by Brams and Taylor (1996), to divide n divisible goods between two par-
ties as fairly as possible15. Adjusted Winner starts with the designation of the items in
a dispute. If either party says an item is in the dispute, then it is added to the dispute
list16.
Like AssetDivider, the parties then indicate how much they value each item, by dis-
tributing 100 points across them17. This information, which may or may not be made
public, becomes the basis for fairly dividing the goods and issues at a later stage. Once
the points have been assigned by both parties (in secret), a mediator (or a computer)
can use Adjusted Winner to allocate the items to each party, and to determine which
item (there will be at most one) may need to be divided. Whilst disputants can probably
linearly order the significance to them of all items in dispute, it is unrealistic to expect
them to give a numerical value to each item. But it is not unreasonable for the users
to assign a linguistic variable to each item. We use a seven point scale which can then
be converted into points (Table 6):
Suppose Bob and Carol select the following terms for the issues in dispute (Table 7):
15 See http://www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner/. Last accessed 2 January 2010 for examples and to
use the Adjusted Winner software.
16 The other party could of course give the item the value zero.
17 In fact if the sum of the items was not 100, the numbers should be scaled. Essentially the disputants are
being asked how they rank and value the items in dispute.
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Table 6 Significance ratings
scale Description Points
Irrelevant 0
Little significance 10
Marginal 20
Moderate 30
Important 40
Very important 50
Essential 60
Table 7 Unscaled ratings
Item Carol Bob
Description Unscaled points Description Unscaled points
Retirement account Marginal 20 Moderate 30
Home Marginal 20 Essential 60
Investments Very important 50 Very important 50
Summer cottage Little significance 10 Marginal 20
Boat Irrelevant 0 Important 40
Total 100 200
Table 8 Scaled ratings Item Scaled points Divisible item?
Carol Bob
Retirement account 20 15 Yes
Home 20 30 No
Investments 50 25 Yes
Summer cottage 10 10 No
Boat 0 20 No
Total 100 100
Scores are then normalised to 100. Bob’s total score is initially 200, thus to scale
his scores, each number is multiplied by 100/200 = 0.5. Carol’s score initially totals
100, so does not need to be normalised (Table 8).
The AssetDivider agent begins by assigning items to the person who put more
points on them. Thus, Bob receives the home and the boat, whereas Carol receives
the investment and retirement accounts. Leaving aside the tied item (summer cottage),
Carol has a total of 70 (20 + 50) of her points, and Bob a total of 50 (30 + 20) of his
points. This completes the “winner” phase of adjusted winner.
Because Bob trails Carol in points (50 compared to 70) in this phase, initially the
summer cottage is awarded to Bob, which brings him up to 60 points (30 + 20 + 10).
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The “adjusted” phase of Adjusted Winner commences now. The goal of this phase is
to achieve an equitable allocation by transferring divisible items, or fractions thereof,
from Carol to Bob until their points are equal.
What is important here is the order in which items are transferred. This order is
determined by looking at certain fractions, corresponding to the items that Carol, the
initial winner, has and may have to give up. In particular, for each item Carol won
initially, the algorithm looks at the fraction giving the ratio of Carol’s points to Bob’s
for that item:
(Number of points Carol assigned to the item)/(Number of points Bob assigned
to the item)
In the example, Carol won two items, the retirement account and the investments.
For the retirement account, the fraction is 20/15 = 1.33, and for the investments the
fraction is 50/25 = 2.0.
The algorithm starts by transferring items from Carol to Bob, beginning with the
divisible item with the smallest fraction. This is the retirement account, with a fraction
equal to 1.33. It continues transferring goods until the point totals are equal.
Notice that if the entire retirement account was transferred from Carol to Bob, Bob
would wind up with 75 (60 + 15) of his points, whereas Carol would plunge to 50
(70 − 20) of her points. Therefore, the parties will have to share or split the item. So
the algorithm’s task is to find exactly what fraction of this item each party will get so
that their point totals come out to be equal.
Thus, let p be the fraction of the retirement account that needs to be transferred
from Carol to Bob in order to equalize totals; in other words, p is the fraction of the
retirement account that Bob will get, and (1 − p) is the fraction that Carol will get.
After the transfer, Bob’s point total will be 60 + 15p, and Carol’s point total will be
50 + 20(1 − p). Since the point totals need to be equal, p must satisfy:
60 + 15p = 50 + 20 (1 − p)
Thus 35p = 10 and so p = 10/35 = 2/7. Thus, Bob should get 2/7 of the retirement
account and Carol should get the remaining 5/7, leaving each party with 64.29 points.
The agent must now make a further adjustment to allocate the percentage property
split it received from the BATNA agent. A universal issue in the form of a cash variable
is used to make this adjustment. The person owing the cash amount is also given the
option of trading a portion of one of their allocated divisible assets should they not
wish to make a cash payment (Table 9).
In the example above, we make the assumption that the dollar value of items has been
agreed upon before negotiations commence. Asset values could possible be decided
by an independent third party or mediator. In reality, however, it is quite conceivable
that a major issue in dispute may involve determining the value of the item. For exam-
ple following a divorce, the husband may agree that the wife should be awarded the
marital home. In this case it would be in his interests to overvalue the house (say he
suggests it is worth $1,200,000) whilst it is in the wife’s interest to undervalue it (say
she suggests it is worth $800,000).
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Table 9 Asset distribution
Item Carol Bob Divisible item?
Retirement account $150,000 $60,000 Yes
Home mortgage (net value) ($270,000–$200,000) $70,000 Yes
Investments $160,000 Yes
Summer cottage $110,000 No
Boat $30,000 No
Cash variable $95,000 Yes
Total value $405,000 $270,000
Percentage split 60% 40%
We therefore need to consider strategies that allow the system to resolve such issues.
One possible solution is to add an automated blind bidding feature where the program
selects a dollar amount from several confidential offers or blind bids based on an
agreed-upon settlement range. Cybersettle18 is one application that uses this strategy
to resolve disagreements over monetary values.
The AssetDivider agent also allows users to input negative values. This is a nec-
essary feature because family mediation clients often have debts (such as credit card
debts and mortgages) which are as much items the negotiation as assets.
There is one main difference between utility function algorithms of the AssetDiver
program and AssetDivider Agent of the new system. When the allocation of an item
breaches the agreed dollar value percentage split, rather than place the item back into
the negotiation and continuing, if divisible, the item is now divided between the two
parties in accordance with the required percentage split. If the item is not divisible,
the cash variable is used to maintained the required split.
6 Evaluating Asset Divider and Future Work
Family_Winner attracted much local and international media interest including var-
ious newspaper articles, radio interviews and a win on an episode of the Australian
TV Program the New Inventors19. Subsequently we were contacted by Mr. Shane
Klintworth, director of the Queensland Branch of Relationships Australia (RAQ).
Relationships Australia is one of Australia’s primary providers of family counsel-
ing and family mediation services. Its Queensland branch runs some national Family
Relationship Centres. These centres provide information and advice on (a) building
and strengthening existing relationships; (b) early intervention and prevention services
for couples thinking of separating; (c) child-friendly services for families in conflict;
(d) FDR services; and parenting plans.
Mr. Klintworth saw the benefits to RAQ of a system that could enhance inter-
est based negotiation. However, he also saw the need to emphasise the paramount
18 http://www.cybersettle.com/pub/. Last accessed 2 January 2010.
19 http://www.abc.net.au/tv/newinventors/txt/s1504763.htm. Last accessed 2 January 2010.
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interests of the children in any system. While meeting parental desires is important,
meeting children’s needs is paramount. Further, especially when the divorcing couple
has children, it is vital to encourage a harmonious on-going relationship between the
parents.
Whilst Family_Winner promotes integrative (win–win) rather than adversarial
(win-lose) solutions and is conducted through processes that are fair and are perceived
by the parties to be fair, RAQ has other needs including:
• the need for decisions to comply with prevailing ethical/ legal principles (such as
the rights of the child and tenancy laws);
• the prevention of further conflict through the development of clear arrangements
(such as prenuptial arrangements between partners and clear guidelines for apart-
ment owners); and
• the promotion of collaborative problem solving between parties.
The organization saw the benefits of a system that could enhance interest based nego-
tiation and expressed interest in using an updated version of the software for their
family mediation sessions. We have since been working with RAQ to develop a new
methodology and software to better represent the needs of the family mediation sector.
AssetDivider is our initial attempt to meet these needs.
In late 2008 a preliminary evaluation of AssetDivider was conducted in conjunction
with our contacts at RAQ, the results of which were reported in Bellucci (2008). The
evaluation process resulted in several modifications being made to the original system
which have now been incorporated into our new IMODRE integrated ODR environ-
ment. The determination of one’s BATNA, a cash variable, acceptance of negative
asset values, and an improved user interface all represent upgrades to AssetDivider.
The fact that the IMODRE system is Web based is potentially of significant advan-
tage to RAQ. A large number of the mediations that the organization conducts are
done through their telephone dispute resolution service. This service is national and
thus many participating disputants are based at great geographical distances apart.
A Web accessible system therefore provides a convenient mechanism for conducting
mediations/negotiations in such circumstances.
When fully implemented the new system will be extensively evaluated and tested
using simulated disputes involving both control and experimental groups. The control
group will use conventional methods of negotiation while the experimental group will
conduct their negotiations using the software. We will the analyse perceived effects
that that the use of the ODR software had on the negotiation process, the difference in
resulting dispute outcomes, as well as a technical analysis measuring system perfor-
mance and usability. Experimental participants will comprise of postgraduate students
undertaking a negotiation unit of study from Victoria University.
The use of simulations involving students as a method is a well tested and accepted
methodology in this type of research across the various disciplinary and professional
divides: See for example Druckman and Albin (2008) and Buelens et al. (2008). The
key advantage of this approach, as in experimental studies generally, is the reduced
ambiguity in specifying the relationship between key variables. Also, it is possible to
closely study the details of a process, such as conciliation, which would be generally
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impossible in a real life situation. Finally, it allows me to impose new strategies in the
situation that is safe but very difficult to do in the real situation.
As a result of the media exposure we were also contacted by Mr. Herman Klein,
director of Victoria Body Corporate Services (VBC). Victoria Body Corporate is a
medium size company offering personalised management services to bodies corpo-
rate, strata title units and company share properties. A major facet of its role is the
successful resolution of disputes amongst body corporate members. Because, in gen-
eral, the disputants live in the body corporate (and hence in close proximity to each
other) it is important that disputes be resolved so that the body corporate members can
continue with harmonious relationships. With this in mind, VBC wishes to develop
software that can help their managers amicably resolve disputes. Mr. Klein believes
that the innovative application of NSSs will give him a marketing advantage over other
body corporate companies.
We have subsequently developed a model of dispute resolution rules for condomin-
ium owners to promote constructive mediation following the resolution of disputes.
We are also in the process of developing agents expertly engineered with domain
knowledge of Victorian property law.
7 Conclusion
In both family law and condominium law, the disputants need to maintain relation-
ships following the resolution of disputes. Thus, as part of a large Australian Research
Council funded project20, we developed an integrated ODR environment to house
NSSs for both housing and family disputes. The paper described various negotiation
strategies including bargaining in the show of the law and the notion of a BATNA,
as well some tools that are available to support these strategies. We presented our
previous work in developing NSS to provide some background to the research. We
then demonstrated our current integrated ODR environment IMODRE, including the
negotiation the strategies that we have deployed, to assist parties involved in Australian
family law disputes achieve fairer negotiated outcomes.
The approach taken is to merge integrative bargaining techniques developed from
argumentation, AI and game theory with a multi-agent environment where individual
agents are assigned specific negotiation tasks. The type of agent interaction is facil-
itative with the agents performing specific negotiation tasks and coordinating with
each other to assist disputants in reaching a negotiated settlement. One agent uses
a Bayesian belief network and an adaptation of Toulmin argument structures to rec-
ommend a percentage property split based on a disputants’ BATNA. Another agent
combines this percentage split with heuristics and game theory to facilitate integrative
bargaining of marital property assets. We believe that the inclusion of a BATNA in the
negotiation process provides an important starting point for negotiations and allows
fairer agreements to be obtained by providing a level of protection against power
imbalances.
20 LP0882328 Developing Negotiation Decision Support Systems that promote constructive relationships
following disputes.
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The system, which was developed in conjunction with industry partners Victoria
Body Corporate Services and Relationships Australia (Queensland branch), respects
ethical and legal principles and relies upon processes that are not only fair but are per-
ceived by the parties to be fair. Apart from merely resolving disputes, we anticipate
that by helping parties reach agreements that better satisfy their long term interests, the
system also supports the continuation of constructive relationships following disputes.
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